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*****
Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and should be forwarded to:
Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War
College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
All U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free of
charge from the USAWC Publications website or the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
website. USAWC Press publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with
permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and
USAWC Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our
website at the following address: ssi.armywarcollege.edu.
*****
For over a decade, the USAWC has published the annual Key Strategic Issues List
(KSIL) to inform students, faculty, and external research associates of strategic topics
requiring research and analysis. Part I of the Academic Year (AY) 2018 KSIL, referred
to as the Chief of Staff of the Army Special Interest Topics, consists of critical topics
demanding special attention. A subset of these topics will be addressed by the USAWC
as Integrated Research Projects. Part II: Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis, has been
developed by the U.S. Army War College in coordination with Headquarters Department
of the Army (HQDA) and Major Commands throughout the Army. The KSIL will help
prioritize strategic research and analysis conducted by USAWC students and faculty,
USAWC Fellows, and external researchers, to link their research efforts and results
more effectively to the Army’s highest priority topics.
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FOREWORD
Today's global security environment remains volatile, uncertain, ano complex.
Resurgent, revanchist, and unstable states, and radical terrorist organizations continue
to challenge the international order, undermine peace and stability, and threaten U.S.
interests. In the face of this, the United States Army remains America's combat force of
decision. If the political leaders of the United States decide to deploy its Army, the
Nation's opponents know they will be defeated. This certainty is the foundation of
America's deterrent capability.
Near-term readiness remains the Army's most pressing focus but we also must
anticipate the broad nature of the future challenges, potential threats, and the military
options that the Army and Joint Force will need to present to America's political leaders.
The Army's educational institutions and its larger network of thinkers are instrumental in
helping meet both near-term and future challenges, particularly by using rigorous
research and analysis to develop ideas for Army leaders. The U.S. Army War College's
Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), which is developed in coordination with Headquarters,
Department of the Army and major Army commands, helps insure that researchers fulfill
this task by focusing on the most pressing strategic issues.
The KSIL is built around broad themes which will remain of interest to the Army in the
coming years. Each theme associates specific research issues meriting analysis. In a
broad sense, the strategic issues deal with developing and using the Army in ways that
maximize its effectiveness and strategic utility across the wide range of potential
missions. This includes both military operations and the efficient management of the
institutional Army.
Since these are issues which Army"1eaders collectively"have ·1dentit1ed as important, I
strongly encourage researchers throughout the military professional educational system
and across the Army's network of thinkers to use them as platforms for generating
ideas. This will help the Army prepare for the future and remain ready to address
America's present security threats, as well as those it might face in the future.

Joh
Ma· r General
Co mandant, U.S.ArmyWar College
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Army War College (USAWC) prepares the Key Strategic Issues List
(KSIL) annually to help focus the research community on topics important to the U.S.
Army, as determined by three criteria:
Relevance. Research on KSIL topics must have the potential to shape Army
actions or policies rather than being background information or for "situational
awareness."
Priority. Selection of KSIL topics is informed by Department of Defense, Joint, and
Army strategic guidance and through the collaboration of defense scholars and
military experts.
Suitability. The KSIL is tailored to the research capabilities of the USAWC. Highly
technical issues requiring specialized or perishable expertise are better handled by
other research and analysis organizations.
The KSIL is organized into eight enduring strategic themes. The third theme, regional
in focus, is subdivided into six sub-themes. Listed under each theme and sub-theme
are high-priority strategic issues that focus potential research.
Each annual update of the KSIL considers the previous year's strategic themes and
issues. While the strategic themes tend to remain constant from year to year, the
strategic issues change often in response to the security environment, defense policy,
and ongoing research.
In order to cultivate original thinking in research, rather than plow over the same
ground, there are no points of contact listed in the KSIL this year.
The Army Study Program Management Office (ASPMO), a subordinate element of the
Army G8, publishes annually a list of focus areas for research. The Fiscal Year 2018
list, reproduced below, covers a broad range of topics that exceeds the scope of the
KSIL. The KSIL may thus be viewed as addressing a subset of the ASPMO list, but, at
the strategic level.
•

Total Force Readiness;

•

Expeditionary Army Capabilities and Capacity;

•

Challenges to Army in the Future Fight;

•

Current and Emerging Gaps: Fires, Air/Missile/Unmanned-Aerial-System;

•

Defense, Armor, Cyberspace, Information/Coercion, Electronic Warfare,
Multi-Domain, Anti-Access Area Denial;
7

•

Training and Leader Development;

•

Soldier & Family Resiliency;

•

Organic Industrial Base, Munitions, and Enterprise Logistics;

•

Generating Force Readiness: Army Workforce Mix;

•

Security Assistance, Stabilization, and Counter-Extremism;

•

Army Financial Management, Information Technology, Real Property
Management, Health Care Management, Human Resources, and
Procurement.

While the KSIL is published annually, the revision process is continuous. Send
feedback and suggestions for future KSIL themes and issues to Colonel Todd Key at
todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil.
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Part I:
Précis of Chief of Staff of the Army Special Interest Topics
______________________________________________________________________
•

Are the Army’s current deployment and distribution processes and systems
adequate to support an expeditionary force in future operating environments?
What lessons have previous studies revealed that should inform future
deployment and distribution capability choices for the Army?

•

Does the U.S. possess the capabilities and capacity to ensure long-term
stability on the Korean Peninsula after combat operations? If not, what
functions must the U.S. Army be prepared to perform to ensure success
during post-conflict operations?

•

How do decisions and actions of intergovernmental organizations, such as
NATO and the EU, impact U.S. land force missions and associated
organizations, functions, capabilities, and capacity? How can the Army
ensure adequate regional access and capabilities are available when required
in Europe?

•

How prepared is the Army to make ready, deploy, employ, and sustain a
totally mobilized Army? What actions can the Army take to prepare the
mobilization enterprise, the national industrial base, and strategic
transportation to support such mobilization?

•

What are the potential impacts of climate change on: a) the character of war,
b) vital U.S. national interests; c) emerging security challenges for the United
States? How could these impacts affect landpower and the organization,
training, and equipping of the U.S. Army?

What strategic components are essential for durable U.S. military advantage across and
within the land, air, sea, space, cyber, information, and electromagnetic spectrum
(EMS) domains in the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) region by 2028? Considering the MultiDomain threats the U.S. will face in the next decade, what strategy and policy initiatives
are critical to ensure the Joint Force can continue to meet enduring defense objectives
against all purposeful IAP threats?
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Part II:
ARMY PRIORITIES FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
ACADEMIC YEAR 2018
Bold Italic: Connotes Chief of Staff of the Army Special Interest Topics
______________________________________________________________________

Theme 1: How can the U.S. Army be more effective in complex
operational environments?
1.1.

Are the Army’s current deployment and distribution processes and
systems adequate to support an expeditionary force in future operating
environments? What lessons have previous studies revealed that should
inform future deployment and distribution capability choices for the Army?

1.2.

Evaluate whether the changing strategic environment and character of war
requires a corresponding change in the way Army leaders think about war.

1.3.

Assess the Army’s readiness and force structure to respond to a humanitarian /
disaster relief and stabilization operation, resulting from the use of a weapon of
mass destruction (e.g., highly contagious biological weapon or dirty bomb).
Assess the effectiveness of U.S. Army relationships with partners to confront
regional hegemons and secure vital U.S. interests.

1.4.

Assess the Army’s ability to conduct joint operations in a contested cyber and
space environment.

1.5.

Assess the Army’s readiness to conduct joint operations in a megacity.

1.6.

Analyze how U.S. land forces can reverse or counter Russia’s anti-access and
area-denial (A2AD) capabilities in northeastern Europe.

1.7.

Given the past decade of contracted service support to forces in the field, assess
the Army’s force structure and capacity to support the Joint Force logistically
(Common User Logistics / Executive Agency) during major combat operations.

1.8.

Evaluate the Army’s requirement to be expeditionary considering the changing
security environment.

1.9.

Evaluate the operational advantages and disadvantages of sharing sensitive
technology with our most capable, and most likely future coalition partners.
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1.10. Assess the Army’s ability to execute mission command and control on a multidomain battlefield that includes: friendly and adversary unmanned systems,
semi-autonomous (human in the loop) robotic systems, and autonomous (no
human in the loop) robotic systems.
1.11. Evaluate the efficacy of the U.S. Army in conducting local governance in the
wake of combat or humanitarian operations.
1.12. Identify how the Joint Force can better leverage capabilities transregionally
through innovative authorities to address transregional threats.
1.13. Assess Army multi-function Intelligence capabilities to support a multi-domain
battlefield.
1.14. Analyze and assess the use of automated identity capabilities to support joint
and multinational operations in a force on force environment.
1.15. Analyze the concept of employing “group think” wiki capabilities for the
development and dissemination of intelligence reporting.
1.16. Assess the degree to which hybrid warfare and constant competition in the
information domain to achieve political objectives short of war have changed the
Joint Phasing Construct; how should an expeditionary Army adapt?
1.17. Evaluate the Army's requirement to be forward positioned, considering the
changing security environment (and increasing usage of proxy wars.)
1.18. Evaluate the extent of U.S. interoperability with NATO partners and the value of
increased interoperability to counter A2AD in Europe.
1.19. What impact have reductions to the size and numbers of echelons above Corps
headquarters had on the Army’s ability to command and control deployed forces
on the highly mobile, complex, and dispersed battlefields of the future?
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Theme 2: To what extent does the Army optimize its effectiveness at
the individual, organizational, and societal levels of the human
dimension?
2.1.

Analyze the Army’s effectiveness in identifying the traits, education, training, and
experience necessary for leaders of military organizations to be effective in the
future environment.

2.2.

What internal and external factors, affect cognition and decision-making in senior
leaders across a broad spectrum of decision categories, within operational and
strategic contexts, and in what manner do they do so?

2.3.

Analyze how the Army can achieve consistent officer quality without detrimentally
affecting diversity.

2.4.

Evaluate if the Army is developing and assessing leaders correctly.

2.5.

Evaluate whether the Army is retaining and promoting the right people.

2.6.

Evaluate the effect of different Army retirement policies.

2.7.

Analyze if professional Army education is fulfilling its mission.

2.8.

Evaluate whether the Army now has the "culture of trust" essential to behavior as
a profession, vice a government bureaucracy, and how well the Army is
inculcating its own professional ethic into individuals, unit climates, and
institutional culture; recommend adaptations as needed.

2.9.

Analyze how the U.S. Army can best export military professionalism to its
international partners, while accounting for local and regional political, social, and
cultural concerns.

2.10. Analyze the nature of mission command at the strategic level and evaluate the
Army's ability to employ this concept effectively.
2.11. Assess the impact on war planning on the insertion of artificially intelligent
systems and achieving technological singularity.
2.12. Assess impact of accompanied (3 years) vs unaccompanied (1 year rotational)
tours for OCONUS unit stationing.
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Theme 3a: What is the best use of the Army to promote U.S. interests
in the Asia Pacific region?
3.a.1. Does the U.S. possess the capabilities and capacity to ensure long-term
stability on the Korean Peninsula after combat operations? If not, what
functions must the U.S. Army be prepared to perform to ensure success
during post-conflict operations?
3.a.2. Analyze the evolution of Chinese “gray zone” approaches and the U.S./allied
role in countering them effectively.
3.a.3. Assess U.S. land force’s role in Air-Sea Battle and 3rd Offset concepts.
3.a.4. Evaluate China’s military strategy and tactics in the Western Pacific and assess
the effectiveness of U.S. Army responses to counter those actions.
3.a.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S. military strategy and the use of U.S. land
forces toward North Korea and Northeast Asia. Suggest an alternative strategy.
3.a.6. Evaluate the value of forward Army basing/presence in the Asia-Pacific in
achieving U.S. national interests.
3.a.7. Assess the Army’s readiness to mobilize, rapidly grow the force and deploy for
major war in the Asia-Pacific region.
3.a.8. Assess the Army’s effectiveness in accomplishing or supporting Asia-Pacific
theater security cooperation plan objectives.
3.a.9. Assess the implications for U.S. land forces to China’s growing support to U.N.
peacekeeping operations worldwide.
3.a.10. Evaluate the Army’s effectiveness in furthering U.S. interests by supporting
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief in the Asia Pacific Region.
3.a.11. Evaluate the effectiveness of USARPAC or a JFLCC’s employment of U.S. land
forces in the Asia Pacific region in furthering U.S. national interests.
3.a.12. Analyze USARPAC's options for employing the Forensic Exploitation
Laboratory-PACOM as a regional forensic exploitation hub within the AsiaPacific Region.
3.a.13. What role does the Army have in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
activities within the pre-crisis space to counter Chinese “gray zone” actions?
3.a.14. Assess the impact of Chinese economic dominance (and modernizing ground
forces) in Central Asia for U.S. land forces.
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3.a.15. Assess the progress of Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept development in
USARPAC.
3.a.16

How can the U.S. work with ASEAN and its related institutions to encourage
China to become a multilateral partner in the region that accepts the precepts
of international law; and what role can the U.S. military play with respect to
ASEAN?

3.a.17. What land power capabilities resident in the physical and information domains
are most useful to a whole-of-government effort to promote stability, access,
and inter-state confidence in East and South East Asia over the coming
decade?
3.a.18. MDB "purpose": neutralizing adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD)
capabilities; how is this best achieved from a Joint, lnteragency,
Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JllM) perspective? Is this the right
purpose? What are the key responsibilities each JllM partner has as it relates
to long-range A2AD?
3.a.19. Does MDB signify a revolution in military affairs, or does it more simply signify
a natural evolution in modern military operations? Analyze through the lens of
Pacific Theater land warfare.
3.a.20. How should the Army respond and provide mission command in contingencies
involving treaty partners (i.e. South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Philippines, and
Australia)? What capabilities are needed for steady state activities and for rapid
response requirements?
3.a.21. How can U.S. Army Pacific best support the Department of State, DoD, the
Joint Staff, and USPACOM engagement strategies with China? How can the
Army develop a comprehensive military partnership with the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) and incentivize greater participation in USARPAC
activities and exercises that are within NDAA guidance?
3.a.22. What countries or allies and partners are best postured to contribute to
deterrence of Chinese aggression or to mitigate escalation if aggression occurs
and how can we strengthen their posture?
3.a.23. What are the existing and emerging opportunities for U.S. Military operations,
activities and actions to create multiple, complex, and compelling dilemmas for
the Peoples Republic of China from the PRC perspective, thus contributing to
achieving U.S. interests in the Pacific Region and beyond? Provide
assessments and recommendations on policies, capabilities, posture, and
forces required to create such dilemmas. (Note: it is important to assess
activities that would compel interest, concern, and provide stimulus for change
based on what motivates the PRC/PLA and not from a U.S. perspective or
value system).
14

3.a.24. Consolidation of a GCC and its service components: is there a relevant
historical example in the U.S. experience? What are the costs and benefits?
What are the redundancies and what potential exists to free up personnel to
cover shortages? What are the PACOM and component capability and
capacity gaps (personnel) during steady state and crisis?
3.a.25. To what extent does India represent a counter-balance in the lndo-Asia Pacific
to help ensure China remains a status quo power; and how can the U.S.
reinforce that counter-balance generally, and from a military standpoint?
3.a.26. Korea pressurization options and long-term posture change: does pressure
work and how can you change posture to truly affect pressure?
3.a.27. Projecting power and fighting on a CBRN battlefield: how does the Army get
better?
3.a.28. How does the Army look at wartrace with a significantly smaller force than was
implemented in the 1990s? How does the joint strategic mobility triad
implement practical change to increase readiness, boost deference, and
assure allies and partners?
3.a.29. How can the Army and the rest of DOD (in coordination with other government
agencies and host nations) optimize funding, composition, location, and
utilization of pre-positioned equipment activity sets for use in operations short
of Major Combat Operations (HA/DR, PKO, Training, and Capacity Building)?
3.a.30. Conduct a comparative analyses of the roles of ASCCs across multiple
geographic combatant commands. Identify similarities, differences, best
practices, opportunities, and challenges. Include a comparison of ASCC
policies, plans, and doctrines for command and control of component forces;
and a comparison of ASCC security cooperation strategies, policies, and plans.
3.a.31. If the DPRK implodes and becomes an ungoverned space, what are the most
plausible scenarios in consideration of U.S., Russian, and Chinese interests?
What are the most appropriate courses of action for U.S. policy and strategy in
the context of each scenario?
3.a.32. How should U.S. Army Pacific support the Japan Ground Self Defense Force
transformation efforts, in light of recent changes in the interpretation of Japan's
security law; and how can USARPAC assist in allaying the concerns of other
Pacific nations regarding Japanese militarism.
3.a.33. What levers are available to the U.S. to further its interests in the Indo-AsiaPacific region? How can the U.S. use these levers and elements of national
power to embrace change in the status quo that has benefitted the U.S. since
the end of World War II?
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3.a.34. Assess the capabilities of land forces to contribute to maritime domain
awareness and sea control in the Pacific region through innovative use of
current U.S. Army capabilities; and through building the capacity of foreign
Army partners. Develop concepts of operation for specific Army systems or
combinations of systems.
3.a.35. Are we neglecting the "human" domain as it relates to MDB? Is it inherently
part of all the other domains, or should it stand alone? How can U.S.forces
expect to be best dominate this domain?
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Theme 3b: What is the best use of the Army to promote U.S. interests
in the Middle East?
3.b.1. Are U.S. security cooperation and partner building programs and activities in the
Middle East adequate to assure U.S. interests in the region and promote longterm stability?
3.b.2. Evaluate Army implications of heightened Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism.
3.b.3. Analyze land force options for limiting Iranian influence in the region.
3.b.4. Analyze Army implications of growing Russian activism in the Middle East.
3.b.5. Analyze if Army forces can stabilize and reconstruct regional states after civil
wars.
3.b.6. Assess the Army’s effectiveness in accomplishing Middle East U.S. theater
security cooperation plan objectives with special emphasis on Egypt and in
maintaining regional peace.
3.b.7. Evaluate the strategic utility of a "light footprint" approach relying on SOF, standoff strikes, and building partner capacity in the Middle East.
3.b.8. Assess Army options to balance direct action, advisory roles, and capacity
development when partnering with Middle Eastern and Central Asian militaries
combating transnational violent extremist organizations.
3.b.9. Assess options for preventing extremists from leaving one battlefield in one part
of the world to join another in a different part of the world. (Extremist migration).
3.b.10 Analyze how Captured Enemy Material (CEM) flow through forensic exploitation
facilities in the Middle East can be improved to ensure the most timely and
efficient method for exploitating CEM with theater assets.
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Theme 3c: What is the best use of the Army to promote U.S. interests
in South and Central Asia?
3.c.1. Assess the Army’s effectiveness in accomplishing U.S. theater security
cooperation plan objectives in South and Central Asia.
3.c.2. Assess the role and impact of deploying U.S. land forces’ between Pakistan and
India during a Kashmir crisis.
3.c.3. Evaluate U.S. land force options to address the resurgent Taliban in
Afghanistan.
3.c.4. Evaluate U.S. land force options to mitigate the impact of ISIS in Afghanistan.
3.c.5. Analyze U.S. land force options for limiting Iranian influence in the region.
3.c.6. Analyze the impact and options of U.S. land forces faced with increasing
Russian activism in Afghanistan.
3.c.7. Evaluate U.S. land force options for improving U.S. relations with Pakistan.
3.c.8. Assess the appropriate role of U.S. Army assistance for India.
3.c.9. Assess the impact of Chinese economic dominance in Central Asia for U.S. land
forces.
3.c.10. Assess U.S. land force options for partnering with Eurasian forces to combat
terrorism while addressing Russian assertiveness.
3.c.11. Assess U.S. land forces potential rolls and requirements in sustaining and
supporting a long term SOF operational presence in Afghanistan.
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Theme 3d: What is the best use of the Army to promote U.S. interests
in Latin America and the Caribbean?
3.d.1.

Evaluate how the U.S. Army can most effectively leverage the National Guard
and State Partnership Programs in its engagements in Latin America and the
Caribbean.

3.d.2.

Evaluate the U.S. Army’s opportunities and challenges with Cuba’s
reintegration into the international community.

3.d.3.

Assess Russian and Chinese activities in the Americas and the appropriate
U.S. Army response.

3.d.4.

Assess the activities of Iran and Islamic extremists in the Americas and the
appropriate U.S. Army response.

3.d.5.

Assess the challenge posed by transnational and transregional threat networks
in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean and the appropriate U.S. Army
response.

3.d.6.

Assess the challenges posed by the potential collapse of Venezuela for its
neighbors, the region, and the U.S., and the appropriate U.S. military response.

3.d.7.

Assess the U.S. Army’s challenges posed by the implementation of the peace
agreement in Colombia, including its impact on the activities of the National
Liberation Army (ELN) and criminal bands operating in the country.

3.d.8.

Evaluate how the U.S. Army can best engage with capable Latin American and
Caribbean partners such as Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia and Mexico to
encourage or expand their participation in international peacekeeping activities.

3.d.9.

Assess challenges in Haiti, particularly those related to the U.N. Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) withdrawal, and what Army opportunities exist for
security cooperation with its federal police and MOI.

3.d.10. Evaluate how the U.S. Army can mitigate the potential for mass migration from
Latin America and the Caribbean, better anticipate potential migration events,
and improve preparedness for a migration-related crisis response.
3.d.11. Analyze USARSO's options for employing an Army Forensic Exploitation
Laboratory as a regional forensic exploitation hub in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
3.d.12. Assess the roll and opportunities for Army forces supporting law enforcement
actions to counter the criminal / terrorist nexus emanating from South and
Central America.
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Theme 3e: What is the best use of the Army to promote U.S. interests
in Eurasia?
3.e.1. How do decisions and actions of intergovernmental organizations, such as
NATO and the EU, impact U.S. land force missions and associated
organizations, functions, capabilities, and capacity? How can the Army
ensure adequate regional access and capabilities are available when
required in Europe?
3.e.2. Assess the Army’s effectiveness in accomplishing U.S. theater security
cooperation plan objectives in Eurasia.
3.e.3. Assess the evolution of Russian “gray zone” approaches and the U.S. Army and
allied role in effectively countering them.
3.e.4. Assess how the Army can best influence force planning and force structure
among key allies in Europe.
3.e.5. Analyze how U.S. land forces can reverse or counter Russia’s A2AD capabilities
in northeastern Europe.
3.e.6. Assess the role of U.S. Army and allied military forces in responding to statesponsored disinformation.
3.e.7. Analyze the role NATO member states’ forces might play in helping U.S. land
forces fulfill operational requirements in Europe.
3.e.8. Evaluate the security challenges for U.S. land forces should oil prices in Europe
and Eurasia remain low.
3.e.9. Assess the Army’s ability to conduct large scale land operations [multi-corps] in
Europe, given current Army headquarters reductions.
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Theme 3f: What is the best use of the Army to promote U.S. interests
in Africa?
3.f.1. Evaluate the ramifications of China’s and/or Russia’s interests in Africa for U.S.
land forces and suggest options, both to compete and to cooperate, to further
U.S. interests.
3.f.2. Evaluate the role of U.S. land forces in the stabilization of an African megacity
and whether existing doctrine, training, equipment, and cultural expertise would
be adequate.
3.f.3. Analyze U.S. land forces contribution and effectiveness in reducing transnational
Islamic extremism in Africa.
3.f.4. Evaluate U.S. Army methods for approaching and developing military
professionalism within African militaries despite potential violations to the Leahy
amendment.
3.f.5. Analyze how the U.S. Army can help African militaries be more effective at
increasing stability on the continent, countering the illicit trafficking of WMD
materials, and providing assistance to other African partners.
3.f.6. Analyze how the U.S. Army and other non-African militaries can collectively
promote regional security.
3.f.7. Assess U.S. Army Africa’s effectiveness in accomplishing Theater Campaign
Plan objectives.
3.f.8. Assess the effectiveness of U.S. Army Africa’s mission command capability to
respond to small-scale contingencies, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief, or to respond to U.S.Government requests to contain outbreaks of
pandemic influenza and other infectious diseases.
3.f.9. Identify how the U.S. Army can best contribute to developing Somalia National
Security Forces to enable transition of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) to Somalia National Security Forces.
3.f.10. Analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of a land-centric, forward component in
East Africa / the Horn of Africa supporting operations, conducting security
cooperation activities, and reducing violence in the region without assigned
forces.
3.f.11. Identify how the U.S. Army can develop the institutional and force generation
capacity of Libya security forces to support both political reconciliation as well as
counter-violent extremist organization (VEO) operations.
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3.f.12. Identify what skill sets and capabilities the U.S. Army should develop for the
proposed Security Force Assistance Corps HQ that will facilitate defense
institution building (DIB) at the executive direction and generating force levels.
Identify how this contributes to more effective governance.
3.f.13. Identify how the U.S. Army can develop the institutional and force generation
capacity of African contributors to regional and/or continental missions.
3.f.14. Assess the U.S. Army’s currently available, or readily adaptable, capabilities (for
analysis, planning, execution, and assessment) and capacity to contribute to
influence operations in Africa per the “Joint Concept for Human Aspects of
Military Operations”, 19 October 2016.” (USAFRICOM and the U.S. Government
have very few means allotted to influence and / or deter (credibly) African political
leaders (legitimate and illegitimate) for the purpose of de-escalating and/or
defusing looming violent upheavals.
3.f.15. Evaluate the effectiveness of defense institution building (DIB) in countries that
are unable to sustain these efforts through self-funding.
3.f.16. Assess the ability of U.S. Army Africa to sustain small-scale, widely distributed
joint force operations in the USAFRICOM AOR.
3.f.17. Analyze how the U.S. Army can best apply its available authorities and limited
resources for the greatest effect, to advance U.S. interests in Africa (i.e., where
should the Army focus its efforts)?
3.f.18. Analyze USARAF's options for employing an Army Forensic Exploitation
Laboratory as a regional forensic exploitation hub in Africa.
3.f.19. Are U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa sufficient to assist in mitigating the
terrorist threat to our partners in Europe? Does the Army need to relook its
counterterrorism assistance programs in light of rising threats to Western
Europe?
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Theme 4: What is the best use of the Army to help defend the U.S.
homeland and North America?
4.1.

How prepared is the Army to make ready, deploy, employ, and sustain a
totally mobilized Armyn? What actions can the Army take to prepare the
mobilization enterprise, the national industrial base, and strategic
transportation to support a Full Mobilization?

4.2.

Assess the U.S. Army role in preparing for and responding to a cyberattack on
the nation's critical infrastructure and the impact on the military's ability to support
civil authorities while deploying forces in response to an overseas crisis.

4.3.

Assess the Joint Force’s current capability and capacity to protect the United
States and its’ territories from the emerging North Korea and Iranian ballistic and
cruise missile threats.

4.4.

Compare the cost for readiness of Active versus National Guard Units and
propose the best force mix (active/NG) for the future security environment.

4.5.

Assess the appropriate and inappropriate roles the U.S. Army can play in
addressing homeland security and support to civil authorities.

4.6.

Assess the appropriateness of transferring Army equipment to U.S. civilian police
organizations and under what conditions should what equipment be considered
for transfer.

4.7.

Assess the role of U.S. Army forces, in conjunction with other Services including
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of State in promoting U.S. interests in
the Arctic.

4.8.

Assess current Army CBRNE capabilities against requirements for a major
disaster scenario such as the New Madrid Earthquake or Cascadia Subduction
Zone and offer risk mitigation options.

4.9.

Analyze and compare authorities and procedures for the U.S. Army’s role in
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance inside vs. outside U.S. territory and
suggest policy changes to improve response efforts.

4.10. Analyze the capability and capacity of the U.S. Army to conduct large scale
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) while doing simultaneous
major combat operations in Europe.
4.11. What industrial base capacity is needed in order to rebuild the Army after two
near simultaneous wars and do we repair forward or return to the depots?
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4.12. Assess the vulnerability of installations to attack and disruption in Multi-Domain
Battle and the need for resiliency and a new approach to installation
preparedness, protection and doctrine, given new technologies, such as cyber
threats, UAVs, robotics, etc.
4.13. Does the Army have clearly defined roles and missions to prepare for and
respond to cyberattacks on National Critical Infrastructure (NCI)? What
capabilities does the Army require to continue to protect NCI and support civil
authorities, while simultaneously deploying forces in response to an overseas
crisis?
4.14. Is the Army prepared to provide Defense Support to Civilian Agencies (DSCA),
Defense Support to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (DSCLEA) and post-event
support necessitated by the use of a weapon of mass destruction on the
Homeland? What capabilities must the Army possess to adequately support civil
authorities before, during, and after a WMD event in the Homeland?
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Theme 5: How will major trends in the strategic environment, defense
strategy or priorities, society, political authority, demographics, and
technology affect the employment of Army forces?
5.1.

What are the potential impacts of climate change on: a) the character of
war, b) vital U.S. national interests; and c) emerging security challenges for
the United States? How could these impacts affect landpower and the
organization, training, and equipping of the U.S. Army?

5.2.

Evaluate the prospect for near- to mid-term “strategic shock”, its potential origin
and character, and its prospective impact on defense strategy, concepts and
capabilities.

5.3.

Analyze how extreme weather conditions (climate change) will affect the
employment of the Army.

5.4.

Evaluate how technologies like Soldier enhancement programs, robotics,
nanotechnology, new materials, new fuels, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality
and micro air vehicles capable of delivering biological weapons will affect the
employment of the Army and military strategy.

5.5.

Assess the Army’s ability to sustain increased end strength, in light of future
social, cultural, political, demographic, and economic changes.

5.6.

Analyze assumption based planning as a means for informing Army leaders,
priorities, and resource allocation.

5.7.

Analyze the impact of "lawfare" on the U.S. Army.

5.8.

Analyze how operational energy will affect the employment of the Army.

5.9.

Assess the feasibility, suitability and acceptability of establishing a cybersecurity
function for the National Guard in support of state and local infrastructure.

5.10. Evaluate the advantages and risks of mission command and its relevance and
practicality on the multi-domain battlefield of the 21st Century.
5.11. Assess the Army’s DOTLMPF impediments to leading and building a JTFcapable HQs capable of fighting hybrid, cyber and gray-area conflicts.
5.12. Evaluate how the Army's Deployable Forensic Exploitation Capabilities should
evolve to support the Joint Force Commander in an environment characterized
by complexity, chaos, and competition.
5.13. Assess the impact of economic inequality in western societies on defense
strategies, addressing mass migration, dislocated populations, and the rise in the
number of failed states.
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5.14. Assess the impact of the removal of fossil fuel as a major supplier of energy and
the replacement of the internal combustion engine in war operations.
5.15. Assess the concept of supply-less logistics.
5.16. Using innovative ideas, propose what logistics could look like in 2030-2050,
taking into account our future operating environments.
5.17. Assess how energy and water security will be integrated into Army operations
and contingency/enduring locations
5.18. Analyze the impact of transgender service on readiness and the impact of
military service on transgender Soldiers.
5.19. Prioritize where the Army should invest in Science and Technology over the next
10, 20 and 30 years to increase combat power over emerging peer-threats.
5.20. Assess how political trends such as districting (gerrymandering), fundraising, and
political action committees and polarization might impact the Army.
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Theme 6: How will social, cultural, political, demographic, and
economic changes affect the U.S. Army?
6.1.

Assess public attitudes and perceptions of the all-volunteer force and evaluate
alternative strategies for countering any negative trends.

6.2.

What legislative changes should the Army propose to improve readiness, quality
of life, and mission effectiveness.

6.3.

Assess how the rise of regional hegemons will impact U.S. Army decisions to
forward deploy U.S. land forces or engage in proxy relationships.

6.4.

Assess how changes in U.S. trade policy might affect U.S. security policy,
alliance structures, and Army requirements.

6.5.

Evaluate the long-term sustainability of increased Army forces given short-term
budget increases.

6.6.

Analyze the ethical integration of Soldier enhancement capabilities.

6.7.

Assess the value of larger, less capable units compared to smaller more capable
units given the complex strategic environment.

6.8.

Analyze the impact of extending time-in-grade limits of Soldiers on active duty to
"grow" the Army.

6.9.

Evaluate the Army officer PME and assignment process for determining
effectiveness in language and cultural proficiency and interagency skills.

6.10. Assess the impact of life extension capabilities (conquering of cancer, increase in
life expectancy to hundreds of years) in force structure.
6.11. Assess the impact of budget constraints and budget unpredictability on U.S.
Army readiness, personnel, and operations.
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Theme 7: To what extent can the Army improve defense management
to facilitate logistics, resource prioritization, decision making, and
adaptation?
7.1.

Assess defense management structure, roles, and decision-support processes to
enhance Army requirements generation and prioritization.

7.2.

Assess the Army’s planning and programing decision-support processes, and
recommend actions to improve resource prioritization outcomes.

7.3.

Compare Army requirements, programming, acquisition, and budget priorities to
assess the effectiveness of system and process interface.

7.4.

Assess the adequacy of the defense management structure, roles and decisionsupport processes necessary to support total mobilization, including three cases
for expansion of the United States Army: 50%, 100%, and 200%.

7.5.

Analyze the appropriate role of intuition, defense management processes,
bargaining, and advisor networks in Army institutional enterprise level
management choices.

7.6.

Evaluate the impact and opportunities for the Army’s force structure as it adapts
to accommodate the expansion of Security Force Assistance Brigades composed
of senior grade personnel.

7.7.

Examine the right force mix and missions for Army active and reserve
components and whether the Army can maintain this force mix with multicomponent and/or cadre units.

7.8.

Assess whether the Army develops the appropriate knowledge, skills, and
abilities of its' leaders to effectively work at Department of the Army level.

7.9.

Evaluate the Army's execution of its executive agency for DoD biometrics and
forensics responsibilities and determine if the joint force is being provided the
capabilities it needs to effectively conduct identity activities.

7.10. Assess and Analyze the impact of modern high causality producing munitions
(thermobaric rounds, tactical nuclear) on the Army and how the Army will conduct
MASCAL operations in an A2AD environment.
7.11. Assess and analyze the Army's current strategy for munitions stationing in
relation to the four plus one problem set.
7.12. Analyze how munitions can be transported to a contested area when an
adversary can strike with "carrier killer" missiles.
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7.13. Are current and planned defense management structures, roles, and decisionsupport processes adequate to address requirements generation and
prioritization in support of future Army and Joint Expeditionary Forces?
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Theme 8: How can the U.S. Army better integrate into the Joint Force to prepare
for and conduct Multi-Domain Battle (MDB)?
8.1

What strategic components are essential for durable U.S. military
advantage across and within the land, air, sea, space, cyber, information,
and EMS domains in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by 2028? Considering the
multi-domain threats the U.S. will face in the next decade, what strategy
and policy initiatives are critical to ensure the Joint Force can continue to
meet enduring defense objectives against all purposeful IAP threats?

8.2.

Evaluate how the evolving character of war will impact the strategic environment
across all domains, and how the Army and the Joint Force should adapt in key
DOTMLPF-P areas. Assess key inhibitors to needed change and possible ways
of dealing with them.

8.3.

Assess and analyze capability gaps and future requirements for Army forces to
operate in cross-domain operations short of war—the Competition Period (phase
0-phase I). Describe how Army forces, as part of a Joint, Interagency, and
Multinational team, could then operate and compete with peer competitors to
defeat their subversive activities, unconventional warfare, and information
warfare short of armed conflict.

8.4.

Describe a new or modified operational framework to enable successful
visualization and mission command of Army and Joint Forces across all domains
in MDB operations (battles and campaigns) against peer competitors.

8.5.

Explain how theater and/or operational level commanders might open windows of
advantage and exploit the initiative in MDB. Account for the operating
environment, peer competitors’ capabilities, and emerging U.S. and allied
capabilities to assess our abilities and challenges to “see” on a future battlefield.

8.6.

Considering that peer competitors are developing ways to fracture the Joint
Force and challenge us in all domains, describe how theater and operational
commanders could target and engage targets across all domains and the electromagnetic spectrum in MDB against peer competitors.

8.7.

Evaluate how operational commanders can operate in and exploit contested and
congested cyberspace, space domains, and the electro-magnetic spectrum.
Assess and describe the organization, capabilities, and authorities required for
these operational commanders and their staffs to operate against peer
competitors who wield similar capabilities with different and often less-limited
authorities.

8.8.

Assess and analyze the institutional limitations, and corresponding solutions, that
need to be overcome to achieve unity of command in MDB in the Competition
Period (phases 0-I) and/or the Conflict Period (phases II-III).
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8.9.

Explain how theater and operational level commanders sustain dispersed
formations, of varying unit sizes, across wide areas when domain superiority is
not achieved. Consider actions in the Competition Period (phases 0-I) and the
Conflict Period (phases II-III).

8.10. Assess and analyze current Army and Joint acquisition process challenges, and
corresponding solutions, that need to be overcome in order to achieve converged
DOTMLPF integration across the domains in sufficient time to meet emerging
capabilities being presented by peer competitors.
8.11. Identify Echelon Above Bridge (EAB) roles and functions to support MDB across
an expanded battlespace. Describe how EAB forces shape operations in support
of MDB. Describe how EAB forces enable, direct, and support tactical (BCT and
below) operations. Are EAB elements simply headquarters or are they fighting
formations? Why?
8.12. Considering that peer competitors put a premium in operating and winning in the
information environment both short of armed conflict and during conflict, identify
and describe capabilities, authorities, and methods required for effective fires and
maneuver in the information environment. How would these capabilities be
employed in an MDB campaign both in the Competition Period (Phases 0-I) and
the Conflict Period (Phases II-III)?
8.13. Define, describe, and explain how cross-domain maneuver and cross-domain
fires will be executed in the multi-domain environment. What changes to
DOTMLPF are required to successfully execute such an operation?
8.14. Describe how Multi-Domain Battle should (or should not) change leader
development, readiness and training for the U.S. Army? What, if any, training will
become obsolete? Describe the process by which a brigade-level unit would train
and become ready to operate in support of an MDB operation?
8.15. Assess the U.S. Army Warfighting Functions and the impact MDB will have on
them. Examine the DOTMLPF impacts and capabilities required to operationalize
MDB. How should the U.S. Army adapt? What are the risks in these adaptations?
8.16. Assess how the U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations and MDB can
integrate and support each other. Examine whether or not a combined concept is
possible between the two ideas. How can the Army and Navy best create a
cross-domain fires linkage, similar to the Army’s Battlefield Coordination
Detachment concept with the Air Force and beyond?
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8.17. Evaluate the U.S. Air Force’s Multi-Domain Command and Control concept and
how it will integrate into the U.S. Army’s mission command network. Identify
opportunities, challenges, and risks in merging these approaches together, under
MDB.
8.18. One working premise of MDB is that all formations of BCT and above must have
access to all domains. Assess this assertion, accounting for the future operating
environment, emerging threats, and possible ways of fighting and defeating a
peer competitor. Describe the echelonment of future multi-domain capabilities
from tactical to strategic; platoon to combatant command?
8.19. Assess and analyze the Army's role and use of watercraft in a multi-domain
conflict.
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